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Aid accelerations, shocks and policies
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Abstract
We address the pitfalls of averaging by exploiting the longitudinal variation
in aid to identify sudden and sharp increases in aid ows. Focusing on specic
events, we test if aid accelerations correspond to policies and shocks in the recipient
country. For a large sample of 145 recipient countries and 33 donors from 1960-
2007, we nd that positive regime changes and wars are signicant predictors of aid
accelerations. Disaggregating aid ows by donors, we nd indicative evidence for
competing allocation rules, particularly among European donors. We argue that
drivers of aid accelerations dier from drivers of average aid ows - a distinction
that can reconcile some of the ambiguous empirical results in the aid literature.
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11 Introduction
This paper uses an event study approach to understand some under-researched aspects
of aid allocation. While the current literature on aid allocation largely neglects aid
volatility by averaging out uctuations, we exploit the longitudinal variation in aid by
identifying sudden and sharp increases in aid ows for a recipient country. By focusing
on these episodes of aid accelerations, we explicitly test if shifting aid ows correspond
to events in the recipient country. This allows us to explore several policy questions: Do
donors reallocate aid following civil conicts and wars? Do donors support developing
countries that democratize or pursue economic reforms? And, perhaps most importantly,
are aid ows coordinated or do donors pursue competing interests?
Using a large sample of 145 recipient countries and 33 donors covering the period 1960
to 2007, we nd evidence for a signicant positive relationship between domestic events
and subsequent aid accelerations. Positive regime changes and wars, in particular, are
signicant predictors of aid ows: International wars are not only associated with aid
accelerations in the recipient country but also predict increasing aid ows in neighboring
countries. Internal conicts, in contrast, do not exhibit a systematic association with aid
accelerations. Disaggregating the aid ows by donor countries, we nd indicative evi-
dence for competing allocation rules, particularly among European countries. Our main
result is robust to changes in measures and the denition of an aid acceleration.
This paper contributes to three areas of research: First, the paper contributes to the
methodology in the aid literature by employing an empirical strategy hitherto only used
in the growth and business cycle literature (Hausmann et al., 2005). Second, we touch
upon the fragility of aid regressions by arguing that drivers of aid accelerations dier
from drivers of average aid ows - a distinction that can reconcile a range of contradicting
and ambiguous results (Roodman, 2007). Finally, we add value to the emerging eld of
security economics by examining spill-overs in conict and aid, thereby testing for the
"securitization of aid" (Murdoch and Sandler, 2002; Woods, 2005).
The remaining sections are organized as follows: Section II reviews the literature on aid
allocation and aid volatility, arguing that most work on aid allocation has not explicitly
looked at the dynamics of aid allocation by averaging out most of the large annual uctu-
ations. Section III rst provides some stylized evidence to characterize country-specic
aid volatility and then proposes a lter to identify aid accelerations. Section IV uses a
2probit model to study the predictors of aid accelerations. Section V concludes.
2 Literature
2.1 Determinants of (average) aid allocation
The main criteria of aid allocation can be divided into economic and political factors3.
Aid, according to economic factors, should ow to the poorest countries, either to meet
nancing gaps (Easterly, 1997) or to yield its highest marginal return (Collier and Dollar,
2002a). Along political factors, on the other hand, aid should ow to low income coun-
tries with "good" institutions to prevent rent-seeking and capture by corrupt regimes
(Azam and Laont, 2003). Political factors can also subsume interests of the donor coun-
try, where aid is allocated along historical path dependencies, ideologies, trade interests
or even domestic security concerns (Azam and Delacroix, 2006).
The evidence in the empirical literature, however, is mixed: Alesina and Dollar (2000)
test for both economic and political criteria in aid allocation using a panel of 128 recipi-
ent countries and 20 donors. In addition to economic factors proxied by GDP per capita
and country size, the authors nd signicant evidence for political and strategic consid-
erations, such as historical colonial ties and political alliances. In contrast using a similar
empirical strategy, Burnside and Dollar (2004) and Alesina and Weder (2002) nd no
evidence that their proxies for policies and governance possess statistically signicant
explanatory power for aid allocation.
The empirical strategy for most existing contributions, however, follows the specica-
tion of growth regressions, relying on regressing period averages on averaged explanatory
variables. Yet, aid growth is conceptually very dierent from conventional GDP growth:
This is well illustrated in Balla and Reinhardt (2008), where a Heckman model is used
to capture the two stage nature of aid allocation. The donor rst decides whether to
allocate aid at all and only then decides how much aid is allocated. Estimating the deter-
minants of aid in two stages, the authors nd a signicant association between aid and
conict, as well as evidence for aid spill-overs from conicts in nearby countries.
Our strategy is not concerned with these time-invariant or slowly changing drivers that
drive average aid ows; instead, we examine the association between specic economic,
3This paper focuses on aid allocation and does not discuss the vast aid eectiveness literature. For
a review of latter eld, refer e.g. to Doucouliagos and Paldam (2010)
3political and social events in the recipient country and the decision of the donor to
increase aid ows. By doing so, we contribute to a clearer distinction between long-run
drivers of average aid ows and short-run drivers of sudden changes in aid ows.
2.2 Aid volatility and the pitfalls of averaging
While there is a large body of literature examining the low persistence of economic
growth, only few studies have explicitly dealt with the volatile nature of aid ows. For
economic growth, Easterly et al. (1993) rst prominently contrasted the high persistence
of policies against the large cross-decade volatility of economic growth: Some countries
like Singapore, Mauritius or Chile would experience sudden upward shifts in growth
rates, while other countries like Afghanistan, Nicaragua or Zimbabwe would suer sud-
den growth collapses. Periods of spectacular growth would follow periods of sudden
collapses, generating country-specic growth patterns (Pritchett, 2000).
These crucial structural breaks, however, were ignored by conventional growth empir-
ics where growth rates were commonly averaged over longer periods (Johnson et al.,
2004). While the averaging procedure removed measurement errors, it came at the cost
of introducing serial correlation and losing annual variations that were possibly key to
understanding the drivers of growth (Acemoglu et al., 2008). Departing from this short-
coming, Hausmann et al. (2005) and Hausmann et al. (2006) employed an innovative
turning point approach. By identifying sudden growth spurts and collapses and examin-
ing correlates around these turning points, it was hoped to nd possible drivers of shifts
in growth trajectory beyond average-based regressions. Since publication of this seminal
article, the methodology has been widely applied to study patterns of growth (Dovern
and Nunnenkamp, 2007; Jones and Olken, 2008; Jong-A-Pin and Haan, 2011).
The role of longitudinal variation, however, is even more important for the case of aid
ows: On the one hand, the sum of aid disbursed is likely to be procyclical and correlated
with the business cycles of the donor countries4. On the other hand, a large fraction of
aid is often allocated following events in the recipient country, for example food aid or
peacekeeping support following prolonged droughts or conicts, respectively. Anecdotal
evidence includes substantial aid inows following the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, as
4Paragraph 42 of the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, for example, explicitly states "we urge developed
countries that have not done so to make concrete eorts towards the target of 0.7 percent of gross
national product (GNP) as ODA to developing countries." (UN Report of the International Conference
on Financing for Development 2002, A/CONF.198/11.)
4well as sudden cuts of aid ows in the aftermath of a negative regime change.
Consider the case of Afghanistan: Figure 1 plots the growth rates of total net bilateral
aid ows between 1960 and 2005 using dierent averaging periods. In contrast to the
annual growth rates, period averages exhibit much lower standard deviations: While the
standard deviation for annual growth rates is 0.67%, it is 0.22% for ve year periods
and only 0.03% for ten year periods. While smoothing short-run volatility is theoreti-
cally justied when examining long-run trend changes in output growth (Hodrick and
Prescott, 1997), averaging removes crucial turning points for aid: In contrast to the
stark aid collapse coinciding with the Soviet invasion 1979, seven and ten year averages
would even suggest a slight increase in aid growth. Similarly, variations coinciding with
the Soviet exit 1987, the end of the Cold War and the US Invasion 2001 are not captured.
Along the period averages, aid ows would have roughly remained constant throughout
the period. If the determinants of aid ows are of main concern, it is not surprising that
estimations using smoothed data often prove fragile (Meyer and Winker, 2005).
Indeed, a growing body of literature stresses the volatile nature of aid. Among a number
of similar studies (Fielding and Mavrotas, 2005; Hudson and Mosley, 2008a), Bulir and
Hamann (2008) for example nd that aid ows are not only procyclical in the recipient
country, but exhibit higher variances vis- a-vis revenue, particularly for aid-dependent
countries. In addition, there is often a large discrepancy in the amount of aid commited
and actually disbursed, rendering aid ows unpredictable. This volatility, combined with
a procyclical allocation, does not only render aid less eective but also intransparent,
allowing corrupt ocials to extract rents (Hudson and Mosley, 2008b; Cage, 2009).
Surprisingly, the related literature on the determinants of aid ows has not yet acknowl-
edged the important role of aid volatility, resorting to the same averaging process done in
growth regressions: Out of the nine major contributions examined in Roodman (2007),
for example, eight rely on four year periods and one on twelve year periods. But if aid
is indeed volatile, with aid inows timed along high frequency events, current ndings
on aid allocation might have averaged out most of the story.
53 Identifying aid accelerations
3.1 Evidence for aid volatility
Before proceeding with the empirical strategy, we establish a few stylized facts under-
lining the signicance of aid volatility. In line with Pritchett (1998), we employ simple
measures to characterize annual aid ows. The data for net disbursed aid (constant
2009 USD) is obtained from OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the
most commonly used dataset in the aid literature. The DAC data denes ODA as ows
to countries which are provided by ocial agencies (states and local governments) and
aimed at promoting economic development and welfare in developing countries. Most
importantly for the purposes of examining aid and security, ODA along the DAC de-
nition does not include military aid or peacekeeping aid5. Table 1 reports measures of
aid volatility for the total aid ows and a breakdown by selected donor countries.
For total aid ows, the median aid growth of all recipient countries is 5.7%, with a
median standard deviation of 67.7%. The median variation coecient is accordingly
high, implying very large within uctuations relative to the mean aid growth rate. The
variation is highest for United States and lowest for Germany. The volatility becomes
even more apparent when tting a single linear trend for log(1 + aid) for each country:
The median standard deviation of the deviation from trend (residual) is about 0.65%
for the total aid ows and increases even more once disaggregated by single donors. The
median R2 of the single trend model is low: The linear trend explains only 1.4% of the
variation in total aid ows. Once disaggregated, the median R2 is nearly zero.
Figure 2 complements the summary statistics by presenting exemplary time-series for
total aid ows to illustrate the aggregate volatility. Following the metaphors in Pritchett
(1998), the volatile aid ow for a given country can be characterized using distinct
patterns. There are, for example, periods of steady declines ("valleys") such as in
Afghanistan 1980-85, Egypt 1965-70 or Israel 1965-70. These periods are followed by
sudden increases in aid ("steep hills") that either stagnate at a high level (for example
the "plateau" in Afghanistan 1990-2000) or gradually decline (the "mountain" pattern
in Egypt). The volatility is further increased by "spikes", large and one-o inow or
outow of aid like in Israel 1995 or Afghanistan 1991. These patterns are often associated
with events such as treaties or wars but are averaged out in panel regressions.
5For a detailed explanation of this denition, see http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/21/34086975.pdf
6In addition to the within country variations, there are also large variations in how aid is
allocated across recipient countries: One way to capture this is to interpret the allocation
as the outcome of developing countries competing for shares of aid (Epstein and Gang,
2009). Following this intuition, the Herndahl index - originally applied to measure
industrial concentration - can be used to capture how concentrated or dispersed a donor
allocates aid (Hirschman, 1964). We compute normalized Herndahl indices over time
for total aid ows and a breakdown by the largest donors.
Figure 3 plots the time-series from 1980 to 2009. While there does not appear to be
a clear trend, there are obvious level dierences across countries. In comparison to
other large donors, US aid ows are most concentrated on average, with an average
Herndahl of 0.09. German aid ows, on the other hand, tend to be more dispersed,
with a Herndahl of 0.03. Like the within volatility, the between volatility in allocation is
large: The US Herndahl, for example, exhibits large sudden "spikes" that are associated
with specic events: While Israel received 8% of all bilateral aid disbursed by the US in
1995, the share jumped to 44% in 1996, the year when Operation Grapes of Wrath was
launched against Lebanon. The second spike coincides with the aftermath of the Iraq
war. While pre-2003 Iraq received nearly zero aid from US, bilateral aid to Iraq had
increased up to 55% of all US aid disbursed in 2005. Even if these examples comprise
the extreme cases, the annual volatility in the share of aid allocated is substantial.
3.2 Constructing the lter
In order to systematically identify sudden spurts of aid inow, we adjust the original
criteria found in Hausmann et al. (2005) for the case of aid. Let yi;t;t+4 denote the least
squares average annual growth rate6 of the aid ow from t to t + 4. By denition, an
aid acceleration has occurred in country i if and only if:
yi;t;t+4  d(yi) (Increase in aid is large) (1)
yi;t;t+4  d(yi) (Increase in aid is accelerating) (2)
where d() returns the 9th decile cut-o for the yi and yi of country i. We depart from
the original lter in Hausmann et al. (2005) in three aspects:
First, while Hausmann et al. (2005) set cut-o points for all countries at yi;t;t+7  3:5%
6The least squares growth rate of aid from t to t+n is the coecient obtained by an OLS regression
of log(yi;t+j) = a + gi;t;t+nt, j = 0:::n
7and yi;t;t+7  2%, we aim to account for country specic volatility by setting the
threshold at each country's highest decile, thereby allowing each country to have its
own cut-o. While common cut-os for GDP growth rates can be justied on the basis
of "stylized facts" (e.g. steady-state GDP per capita growth is 2% p.a.), aid volatility is
largely country specic. Second, while the original lter was aimed at capturing long-
run trend shifts using 8 year periods, we examine 5 year periods7. Again, the reason
here is the high volatility of aid where single year blips ("spikes") are averaged out
using long periods. Third, we drop the last condition of the original lter that excluded
periods of convergence growth (yi;t;t+7  max(yi)8i  t). While an ever rising GDP
is deemed favourable, it does not hold for aid ows. Since the concept of convergence
growth is not transferable to the growth of aid ows, we simplify the lter by removing
this rule. Finally, we follow Hausmann et al. (2005) and employ a structural break test
to determine the onset when several subsequent years qualify as an aid acceleration. In
line with Xu (2011), we interpret the original test as a Chow test and date the onset to
the year where the test statistic is highest among the subsequent years.
3.3 Aid accelerations
We nd a large number of aid accelerations (Figure 4): Based on the lter employed, we
identify 215 aid accelerations for the total ow of all aid allocated between 1960 and 2007
(Table 2)8. For the sample of 145 countries, this translates into 1.5 accelerations per
country on average. Examining the list, it is encouraging to see that the modied lter
roughly identies most of the well-known accelerations often associated with specic
events (e.g. Egypt 1968, Somalia 1991, Afghanistan 2000, Iraq 2002). But like the case
of growth accelerations, there are also a large number of episodes that do not appear to
be associated with any large and observable changes. The question how far events such
as regime changes, international wars or civil conict consistently correlate with these
accelerations will be examined below using a probit regression.
The unconditional probability of an aid acceleration is calculated by dividing the number
of accelerations by the total number of country-years. Dividing the 215 accelerations
by the 5308 country-years yields an unconditional probability for an acceleration of
about 4% for a given country-year. This probability does not vary substantially across
7Since we are running a structural break test (see below), we need at least 4 year periods in order to
estimate the parameters. To ensure the results are not driven by our denition, we also experimented
with dierent periods but the results do not change substantially.
8Refer to the Webappendix for a complete list of aid accelerations
8decades: The probability of an acceleration is 4% for the 60s, 5% for the 70s and about
3.5% for the 80s and 90s. The region9 with the highest probability is 4.7% in Middle
East and North Africa and lowest in Eastern Europe and Central Asia with 2.8%. The
unconditional probability does not change substantially when separately applying the
lter to each donor: The unconditional probability is highest for USA (4.5%) and United
Kingdom (4.4%) and lowest for Sweden (2.8%) and Spain (3.4%).
Aid accelerations do not only occur frequently, but their magnitudes are very large:
On average, the least squares growth rate  gt;t+4 of an aid acceleration over 5 periods is
92.75% p.a., with a considerable acceleration vis- a-vis the previous period of 118.91%
( gt;t+4). Since these changes in aid allocation are sudden and substantial, they are
likely to correspond to policy changes or other events in the recipient country.
The volatility of aid becomes once more apparent when dividing accelerations into un-
sustained and sustained accelerations. By denition, an aid acceleration is sustained if
its least squares average growth rate in [t + 5;t + 9] is positive and unsustained other-
wise. Applying this rule, 66 of the 215 episodes are agged as unsustained accelerations
with a  gt+5;t+9 =  19:1%, implying that almost a third of the large increases in aid are
partially reversed. While the majority of accelerations are sustained, the subsequent
average growth rate is 63.65% lower than during the acceleration.
4 Predicting aid accelerations
4.1 Estimation and approach
We t a probit model to gauge the association between a range of explanatory variables
and the onset of aid accelerations. In brief, we estimate:
yit = (xit + dt + zi + it) (3)
where yit = yit+1 = yit+2 = 1 if an acceleration occured in country i at year t. We code
the two periods following an acceleration as 1 to account for imperfections of the lter
in identifying the exact turning point. Since the empirical strategy compares countries
with aid accelerations in a given year to countries without, we drop all data pertaining
to the periods t + 2:::t + 5. We regress the onset of an aid acceleration yit on the
9We follow Hausmann et al. (2005) by using their regional denitions.
91  k vector xit that captures changes in a set of k explanatory variables. dt is a 1  T
vector of dummies that varies over the T years and controls for time-variant confounds
all recipient countries are equally subject to. zi is a 1  R vector controlling for time
invariant eects of the R regions the countries are grouped into. ,  and  are the vector
of coecients, where the main interest lies on the estimated . it is the disturbance
term and  is the cdf of a standard normal distribution.
4.2 Explanatory variables
Conict: The main conict variables are derived from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Con-
ict Dataset v4-2009 (Gleditsch et al. 2002), documenting conicts over the period
1946-2008. The dataset enables a distinction between international wars and internal
wars10. prio inter1it is a dummy indicating the outbreak of an interstate conict or in-
ternationalized internal armed conict. Analogously, the dummy prio intra1it captures
an internal armed conict in i at t. We combine the conict dataset with a distance ma-
trix from CEPII (Mayer and Zignano 2006) to construct measures for spill-over eects.
prio inter3xit is a dummy for international conicts beginning in t that are located in
countries bordering country i. Similarly, prio intra3xit is a dummy that captures a
internal conicts occuring in the direct neighborhood of country i at t.
Policy: In line with Hausmann et al. (2005), we measure changes in political institutions
using the Polity IV index (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). The Polity IV dataset assigns a
score ranging from -10 to 10 for each country-year beginning 1800, where higher values
indicate a larger degree of democracy. Along the manual, positive or negative regime
changes are annual changes by at least three unit points in the respective direction.
Economic reforms are crudely proxied using a dummy for openess. Constructed by Sachs
and Warner (1995), we use the updated data from Wacziarg and Welch (2008). Although
originally designed to capture trade liberalization, we argue that these liberalizations are
accompanied by substantial changes in economic fundamentals and serve as an adequate
proxy for changes in economic policy (Hausmann et al., 2005).
Geopolitics: Finally, we use three dummies that capture changes in geopolitics. To
capture the changing logic of aid allocation following the collapse of the Soviet Union
(Kanbur, 2003), coldwart = 1 for all t up to 1990 and 0 for subsequent years. indepit = 1
10Since the main focus is on abrupt and large changes, we restrict the analysis to conicts with at
least 1.000 battle-related deaths in a given year.
10if country i declared independence in t. As 9/11 is associated with the securitization of
aid (Wood 2005), post2001t = 1 for all t after 2001. To allow for a delayed response to
year-specic events, all dummies are also coded 1 for t:::t + 211.
4.3 Drivers of aid acceleration
Table 3 presents a step-wise inclusion of the event variables for a regression based on
aggregate aid accelerations. In Column I, we report the baseline specication using
the two immediate conict variables. International conicts are signicantly associated
with aid accelerations, while internal conicts are statistically insignicant. The dif-
ference between both types of conicts becomes once more apparent when including
spill-overs (Column II). Countries bordering neighbors subject to international conicts
are signicantly more likely to experience sudden aid inows, while the association is
not signicant for neighbors with internal conicts.
In contrast to negative regime changes, positive regime changes are signicantly asso-
ciated with aid accelerations, albeit at a low signicance level (p = 0:034). Economic
reforms - proxied as transitions towards openess - exert no statistically signicant as-
sociation with the probability of aid accelerations (Column III). Geopolitical events
such as the declaration of independence are signicantly associated with aid accelera-
tions (Column IV). International conicts, their spill-overs and positive regime changes
remain statistically signicant once controlling for regional xed eects (Column V).
In addition, the Cold War coecient turns signicant, arguably since Cold War aid
accelerations were mostly conned to a few regions (Berger et al., 2010).
Even though the interpretation of non-linear models is not straightforward, it is worth-
while to examine the economic signicance of the coecients. With other variables held
constant at their means, the marginal eect of an international war and its spill-over
on the probability of an aid acceleration is 10.8% and 7.2%, respectively: For an "aver-
age country" in an "average year", the outbreak of an international conict raises the
probability of an aid acceleration by about 11% points. Even if the country itself is not
experiencing an international conict, the occurence of such in a bordering country raises
the probability by around 7% points. The marginal eect of independence is of similar
magnitude (9%) but the coecient for positive regime changes is small (3.5%).
11This is a standard procedure in Hausmann et al. (2005). As the choice of lag introduces additional
degrees of freedom, we conduct robustness checks with dierent lags (Section 3.).
11In order to gauge the dierences between our event study and conventional averaging,
we compare the aid accelerations approach (Table 4, Column I) to standard OLS speci-
cations that use various period averages for aid growth (Roodman, 2007). The results
based on averaging tend to diverge from the results of the event study. Most of the ex-
planatory variables are fragile upon changes in the averaging period (Column II-V): The
coecient for international conicts, for example, is insignicant using annual averages,
positive signicant using 5 year averages, negative signicant using 7 year averages and
insignicant again using 10 year averages. Once more, the results suggest that existing
work based on averages might have masked a range of short-run responses, with results
possibly driven by artifacts of averaging over longer periods.
4.4 Do donors coordinate?
In Table 5, we report the regression by donor breakdown using the full specication
(Table 3, Column V). Even though missing values and dierent time periods complicate
a comparison between the regressions, the results at least indicate that donors within
the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) follow dierent allocation rules:
Out of the ten largest DAC donors, the coecient for international conict and positive
regime change is only signicant for ve donors. The coecient for economic reforms,
for example, is only signicant for Japan and Spain but point to dierent directions.
As another example, while the spill-over coecient for internal conicts is positive and
signicant for USA, Japan and Norway, the estimated coecient for Sweden points to
the opposite direction. Overall, Sweden appears to allocate aid very dierently, being
the only country with a signicant spill-over coecient for internal conicts.
The disaggregation also suggests that the "net" eect for accelerations based on total aid
ow masks a diverse range of counteracting allocation rules. While the spill-over term
for internal conicts is signicant for four of the ten largest DAC donors, the opposing
signs render the overall coecient insignicant for predicting aggregate aid accelerations.
Similarly, the aggregate results would suggest a signicant positive coecient for the
declaration of independence but the disaggregation shows that countries such as United
Kingdom, Japan and Netherlands alone tend to do the opposite.
If all countries aimed to allocate aid according to similar "eciency" criteria (Collier and
Dollar, 2002b), this result would be discouraging. The case of the European Union (EU)
provides a striking example of a possible coordination problem. Despite the repeatedly
12declared eorts in harmonizing foreign and security policy, aid allocation is not only
incoherent but the competing aid ows tend to oset each other. This renders the
overall EU aid accelerations highly unpredictable by our model.
To illustrate this, Table 6 reports a step-wise regression with accelerations based on the
pooled EU aid ows. Unlike the baseline regression in Table 3 that exhibited a distinct
pattern for the prediction of aid accelerations, none of the event variables - conicts,
wars, geopolitical shifts - turn out to be statistically signicant predictors for the EU.
Only the coecient for Cold War turns out signicant once controlling for regions. If the
EU acted as a unitary donor, however, one would expect clearer allocation rules.
While the underlying reasons (coordination failure, political interests etc.) for the com-
peting behaviour is unclear, it is possible to examine which countries allocate aid along
similar rules by examining how often growth accelerations coincide between donors. A
simple approach is to calculate the Jaccard index for the binary acceleration indicator
and examine the resulting similarity matrix. Table 7 presents the results for EU donors:
Within the EU, the aid accelerations of United Kingdom and Netherlands are most
synchronized (0.079), followed by the French-German and German-UK aid ows (0.07).
While Sweden and Norway are often aggregated as the "Scandinavian donors" (Alesina
and Dollar, 2000), the similarity index between their aid accelerations is actually rel-
atively low (0.029). The most dissimilar aid accelerations are between Germany and
Netherlands (0.009), followed by Germany-Spain (0.011) and Sweden-UK (0.014).
4.5 Robustness checks
As macroeconomic studies are notoriously prone to fragility (Roodman, 2007; Jarocinski
and Ciccone, 2009), we do robustness checks to check the validity of our results:
We replace the UCDP/PRIO conict variable with a measure based on the Major
Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) data (Marshall 2010). In contrast to binary indi-
cators from UCDP/PRIO, the MEPV data assigns dierent intensities to the conicts.
We generate proxies for international and internal conicts based on the distinction
between interstate MEPV and "societal" MEPV12. The main results for international
war and their spillovers remain stable but the coecient for internal wars turns signif-
icant (Table 8, Column II). This, however, is driven by the dierent coding scheme of
12Interstate MEPV is the sum of international violence and international war, while "societal" MEPV
is the sum of civil violence and war and ethnic violence and war.
13the MEPV, where some international conicts were coded as internal conicts13. We
also replace the Polity IV proxies using a similar measure based on the Freedom House
dataset. The coecient for positive regime changes remains stable, with negative regime
changes turning marginally signicant (Column III).
In addition, we alter the lter rule by reducing the 9th decile cut-o to an 8th decile cut-
o and remove the lag, instead coding the period around an acceleration as accelerations
as well (Hausmann et al., 2005). Again, the main results remain stable (Column IV),
providing evidence that the results are not artifacts of the lter. Finally, we re-estimate
the probit model using the linear probability model (LPM) and a Tobit specication
but the results again do not change substantially (Column V-VI).
5 Conclusion
This study examines the relationship between aid accelerations and domestic events. By
drawing upon a methodology from the growth literature, we depart from conventional
approaches, focusing on specic events rather than period averages: Our ndings suggest
that events such as wars, regime changes and geopolitical shifts are statistically signi-
cant predictors of aid accelerations. We also nd evidence for spill-overs, where countries
that neighbor war-torn countries are almost as likely to have an aid acceleration - even in
absence of a conict spill-over. By disaggregating aid ows, we nd indicative evidence
for competing aid allocation rules. In the case of the EU, these competing rules oset
each other, rendering the overall aid ows highly idiosyncratic.
Even though our empirical strategy does not identify causal eects per se, our evidence
is at least more causal than existing correlations: By exploiting the temporal dimension
using the event-based approach, we argue that the causation runs from domestic events
to donor response. While temporal sequence need not necessarily reect causation14,
it is unlikely that the outbreak of large domestic events (e.g. a civil war) is driven by
the anticipated subsequent inux of aid. Since aid accelerations often coincide with
specic domestic events, it is further possible to complement the quantitative study
with qualitative case studies in order to more reliably infer to causality. This is another
advantage of our approach in comparison to average-based regressions.
13The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, for example, is coded as an internal conict in the MEPV.
14The "post hoc ergo propter hoc" fallacy
14References
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, J. A. Robinson, and P. Yared (2008): \Income and
Democracy," American Economic Review, 98, 808{42.
Alesina, A. and D. Dollar (2000): \Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?"
Journal of Economic Growth, 5, 33{63.
Alesina, A. and B. Weder (2002): \Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign
Aid?" American Economic Review, 92, 1126{1137.
Azam, J.-P. and A. Delacroix (2006): \Aid and the Delegated Fight Against Ter-
rorism," Review of Development Economics, 10, 330{344.
Azam, J.-P. and J.-J. Laffont (2003): \Contracting for aid," Journal of Develop-
ment Economics, 70, 25{58.
Balla, E. and G. Y. Reinhardt (2008): \Giving and Receiving Foreign Aid: Does
Conict Count?" World Development, 36, 2566{2585.
Berger, D., W. Easterly, N. Nunn, and S. Satyanath (2010): \Commercial
Imperialism? Political Inuence and Trade During the Cold War," Working Paper
15981, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bulir, A. and A. J. Hamann (2008): \Volatility of Development Aid: From the
Frying Pan into the Fire?" World Development, 36, 2048{2066.
Burnside, C. and D. Dollar (2004): \Aid, policies, and growth : revisiting the
evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3251, The World Bank.
Cage, J. (2009): \Asymmetric information, rent extraction and aid eciency," PSE
Working Papers 2009-45, PSE (Ecole normale suprieure).
Collier, P. and D. Dollar (2002a): \Aid allocation and poverty reduction," Euro-
pean Economic Review, 46, 1475{1500.
||| (2002b): \Aid allocation and poverty reduction," European Economic Review,
46, 1475{1500.
Doucouliagos, H. and M. Paldam (2010): \Conditional aid eectiveness: A meta-
study," Journal of International Development, 22, 391{410.
15Dovern, J. and P. Nunnenkamp (2007): \Aid and Growth Accelerations: An Alter-
native Approach to Assessing the Eectiveness of Aid," Kyklos, 60, 359{383.
Easterly, W. (1997): \The ghost of nancing gap: how the Harrod-Domar growth
model still haunts development economics," Policy Research Working Paper Series
1807, The World Bank.
Easterly, W., M. Kremer, L. Pritchett, and L. H. Summers (1993): \Good
policy or good luck?: Country growth performance and temporary shocks," Journal
of Monetary Economics, 32, 459{483.
Epstein, G. S. and I. N. Gang (2009): \Poverty and Governance: The Contest for
Aid," Review of Development Economics, 13, 382{392.
Fielding, D. and G. Mavrotas (2005): \The Volatility of Aid," Working Papers
DP2005/06, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
Hausmann, R., L. Pritchett, and D. Rodrik (2005): \Growth Accelerations,"
Journal of Economic Growth, 10, 303{329.
Hausmann, R., F. Rodriguez, and R. Wagner (2006): \Growth Collapses," Work-
ing Paper Series rwp06-046, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Govern-
ment.
Hirschman, A. O. (1964): \The Paternity of an Index," The American Economic
Review, 54, p. 761.
Hodrick, R. J. and E. C. Prescott (1997): \Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An
Empirical Investigation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 29, 1{16.
Hudson, J. and P. Mosley (2008a): \Aid Volatility, Policy and Development," World
Development, 36, 2082{2102.
||| (2008b): \The macroeconomic impact of aid volatility," Economics Letters, 99,
486{489.
Jarocinski, M. and A. Ciccone (2009): \Determinants of Economic Growth: Will
Data Tell?" Working Papers 2009-36, FEDEA.
Johnson, P., S. N. Durlauf, and J. R. W. Temple (2004): \Growth Econo-
metrics," Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series 61, Vassar
College Department of Economics.
16Jones, B. F. and B. A. Olken (2008): \The Anatomy of Start-Stop Growth," Review
of Economics and Statistics, 90, 582{587.
Jong-A-Pin, R. and J. Haan (2011): \Political regime change, economic liberaliza-
tion and growth accelerations," Public Choice, 146, 93{115.
Kanbur, R. (2003): \The Economics of International Aid," mimeo.
Meyer, M. and P. Winker (2005): \Using HP Filtered Data for Econometric Analy-
sis: Some Evidence from Monte Carlo Simulations," Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv,
89, 303{320, 10.1007/s10182-005-0206-9.
Murdoch, J. C. and T. Sandler (2002): \Economic Growth, Civil Wars, and Spatial
Spillovers," The Journal of Conict Resolution, 46, pp. 91{110.
Pritchett, L. (1998): \Patterns of economic growth : hills, plateaus, mountains, and
plains," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1947, The World Bank.
||| (2000): \Understanding Patterns of Economic Growth: Searching for Hills
among Plateaus, Mountains, and Plains," World Bank Econ Rev, 14, 221{250.
Roodman, D. (2007): \The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid, Development, and Cross-
Country Empirics," World Bank Economic Review, 21, 255{277.
Sachs, J. D. and A. M. Warner (1995): \Natural Resource Abundance and Eco-
nomic Growth," NBER Working Papers 5398, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc.
Wacziarg, R. and K. H. Welch (2008): \Trade Liberalization and Growth: New
Evidence," World Bank Economic Review, 22, 187{231.
Woods, N. (2005): \The shifting politics of foreign aid," International Aairs, 81,
393{409.









1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
cid
annual 5 year average
7 year average 10 year average
Afghanistan 1960 - 2005
Net bilateral aid growth rate with different averages
Figure 1: Net bilateral aid (OECD DAC) growth rate with dierent period averages.
First break in 1979 coincides with the Soviet Invasion, second break coincides with the
withdrawal in 1987, third break coincides with the Afghanistan War 2001.
Std of dev. 1st dis. Median abs. Trend
from trend CoV Stdev Mean 2nd dis.*100 R2
Aid from all donors
Mean 1.208 57.145 1.231 0.081 -1.697 0.055
Median 0.649 9.039 0.677 0.057 -0.956 0.014
Standard deviation 1.167 165.025 1.166 0.127 7.596 0.087
Aid from USA
Mean 2.090 85.474 2.110 -0.012 -1.173 0.005
Median 2.078 30.367 2.099 0.007 0 0.005
Standard deviation 1.297 166.481 1.295 0.156 23.102 0.074
Aid from GBR
Mean 1.879 1089.28 1.902 -0.011 -5.1 0.031
Median 1.920 21.890 1.947 -0.014 0 0.005
Standard deviation 0.958 123.768 0.955 0.148 26.2 0.073
Aid from GER
Mean 1.673 80.52 1.704 0.017 0.07 0.043
Median 1.444 17.88 1.466 0.063 -0.1 0.013
Standard deviation 1.108 524.79 1.122 0.223 35.99 0.072
Aid from FRA
Mean 1.594 66.088 1.613 0.018 0.131 0.030
Median 1.316 24.367 1.325 0.028 0 0.006
Standard deviation 1.126 118.418 1.129 0.121 37.228 0.053
Aid from SWE
Mean 2.171 189.159 2.216 0.053 -3.677 0.046
Median 2.222 25.813 2.277 0.052 0 0.007
Standard deviation 1.047 1086.34 1.048 0.119 50.332 0.102
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Figure 4: Selected time series and the detected aid accelerations.
201960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Sum
E. Europe and C. Asia 0 0 1 3 0 4
(0) (0) (0.1) (0.04) (0) (0.02)
M. East and N. Africa 6 11 9 4 3 33
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
S. Asia 3 5 1 3 3 15
(0.02) (0.02) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
West Europe 1 0 0 0 0 1
(0.001) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0.001)
N. America 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Sub.S. Africa 12 27 8 11 9 67
(0.08) (0.12) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
L. America and Carib. 5 11 16 15 10 57
(0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Other 8 11 9 7 3 38
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Sum 35 65 44 43 28 215
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Table 2: Frequency of aid accelerations across regions
Notes: Unconditional probability (frequency divided by number of country-years) in brackets below.
Base (I) Spill (II) Policy (III) Geopol. (IV) Region FE (V)
prio inter1 0.108+ 0.115+ 0.113+ 0.113+ 0.108+
(3.41) (3.61) (3.56) (3.56) (3.41)
prio intra1 0.030 0.030 0.028 0.030 0.035
(1.19) (1.18) (1.13) (1.21) (1.36)
prio inter3x 0.071+ 0.072+ 0.068+ 0.072+
(3.13) (3.19) (3.04) (3.18)
prio intra3x 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.010
(0.49) (0.46) (0.50) (0.57)
poschange3 0.036** 0.031* 0.035**
(2.12) (1.84) (2.09)
negchange3 0.012 0.004 0.008
(0.53) (0.19) (0.36)








Region FE No No No No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.034 0.037 0.038 0.040 0.044
N 4838 4838 4838 4838 4838
Table 3: Sustained and unsustained accelerations with controls
Notes: Estimated by probit. Coecients shown are marginal probabilities evaluated at the sample
means. Numbers in parenthesis are robust t-statistics. * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:5, + p < 0:01. All
regressions include time dummy variables. Constant not reported.
21Event (I) Ann. aid grwth(II) 5 yr avg (III) 7 yr avg (IV) 10 yr avg (V)
prio inter1 0.108+ 0.111 0.077 0.046 0.032
(3.41) (1.35) (1.37) (1.12) (0.58)
prio intra1 0.035 -0.005 0.001 -0.016 0.012
(1.36 ) (-0.16) (0.04) (-0.50) (0.63)
prio inter3x 0.072+ 0.006 0.108** -0.042* 0.001
(3.18) (0.21) (2.04) (-1.72) (0.06)
prio intra3x 0.010 -0.016 -0.014 -0.018 -0.044*
(0.57) (-0.60) (-0.77) (-0.79) (-1.85)
poschange3 0.035** -0.005 0.002 0.033* -0.016
(2.09) (-0.20) (0.12) (1.76) (-1.10)
negchange3 0.008 0.068 0.010 0.028 -0.035
(0.36) (1.64) (0.26) (1.09) (-0.68)
econlib pos3 0.025 -0.056 0.033 0.011 0.006
(0.90) (-1.14) (0.94) (0.36) (0.15)
coldwar 0.025 0.135 0.005 0.054**
(0.90) (1.20) (0.25) (2.23)
independence 0.091+ 0.193+ 0.021 0.019 0.083
(2.96) (2.99) (0.23) (0.54) (1.02)
post2001 0.079* 0.056
(1.51) (0.75)
(Pseudo) R2 0.044 0.019 0.059 0.072 0.09
N 4838 5168 982 734 473
Table 4: Comparing aid accelerations against average aid ows
Notes: Estimated by probit (Column I) and OLS (Column II-V). For Column I, coecients shown
are marginal probabilities evaluated at the sample means. Numbers in parenthesis are robust t-
statistics (clustered at country level for OLS). * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:5, + p < 0:01. All regressions


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23Base (I) Spill (II) Policy (III) Geopol. (IV) Region FE (V)
prio inter1 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(-0.42) (-0.39) (-0.38) (-0.38) (-0.37)
prio intra1 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.018
(1.24) (1.28) (1.22) (1.22) (1.30)
prio inter3x 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.28) (0.31) (0.32) (0.38)
prio intra3x -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010
(-1.06) (-1.05) (-1.05) (-1.01)
poschange3 0.011 0.011 0.011
(1.20) (1.20) (1.20)
negchange3 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003
(-0.40) (-0.39) (-0.26)








Region FE No No No No Yes
(Pseudo) R2 0.039 0.040 0.041 0.041 0.043
N 5034 5034 5034 5034 5034
Table 6: Predicting aggregate EU aid accelerations
Notes: Estimated by probit. Coecients shown are marginal probabilities evaluated at the sample
means. Numbers in parenthesis are robust t-statistics. * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:5, + p < 0:01. All
regressions include time dummy variables and region xed eects. Constant not reported.
ESP NLD NOR FRA GBR SWE GER
ESP 1 0.060 0.029 0.045 0.039 0.009 0.011
NLD 0.060 1 0.042 0.047 0.079 0.047 0.009
NOR 0.029 0.042 1 0.045 0.040 0.027 0.044
FRA 0.045 0.047 0.045 1 0.051 0.050 0.070
GBR 0.039 0.079 0.040 0.051 1 0.014 0.061
SWE 0.009 0.047 0.027 0.050 0.014 1 0.050
GER 0.011 0.009 0.044 0.070 0.061 0.050 1
Table 7: Proximity matrix for aid accelerations
Notes: Calculated using the Jaccard index.













econlib pos3 0.025 0.027 0.021 0.011 0.008 0.009
(0.90) (0.98) (0.78) (0.42) (0.31) (0.30)
coldwar 0.025 0.088** 0.090** 0.068 0.059 (dropped)
(0.90) (2.25) (2.25) (1.55) (1.31)
independence 0.091+ 0.116+ 0.132+ 0.099** 0.098** 0.115**
(2.96) (2.94) (3.23) (2.43) (2.11) (2.10)
post2000 0.079* 0.066 0.088 0.068 0.060 (dropped)
(1.51) (1.39) (1.66) (1.25) (1.46)
mepv inter1 0.027+ 0.027+ 0.032+ 0.047+ 0.056+
(3.39) (3.41) (3.99) (3.39) (3.29)
mepv intra1 0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 0.016** 0.019**
(2.44) (2.49) (2.36) (2.08) (2.07)
mepv inter3x 0.022+ 0.021+ 0.023+ 0.028** 0.033**
(2.91) (2.82) (2.91) (2.45) (2.44)
mepv intra3x -0.005 -0.004 -0.009 -0.009* -0.010*
(-0.93) (-0.89) (-1.60) (-1.84) (-1.86)
free pos3 0.034+ 0.028** 0.029** 0.033**
(2.74) (2.18) (2.29) (2.31)
free neg3 0.036* 0.031 0.032 0.037
(1.79) (1.48) (1.56) (1.58)
(Pseudo) R2 0.044 0.046 0.047 0.045 0.04 0.03
N 4838 4742 4742 4675 4675 4675
Table 8: Predicting total aid accelerations
Notes: Estimated by probit. Coecients shown are marginal probabilities evaluated at the sample
means. Numbers in parenthesis are robust t-statistics. * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:5, + p < 0:01. All
regressions include time dummy variables and region xed eects. Constant not reported.
25